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With the new harmonised regulations for damage stability, SOLAS 2009, now in place (since January 
2009), a number of ship owners and consequentially yards and classification societies are venturing to 
exploit the new degrees of freedom afforded by the probabilistic concept of ship subdivision. In this 
process, designers are finding it rather difficult to move away from the prescriptive mindset that has been 
deeply ingrained in their way of conceptualising, creating and completing a ship design. Total freedom 
it appears is hard to cope with and a helping hand is needed to guide them in crossing the line from 
prescriptive to goal-setting design. This will be facilitated considerably with improved understanding 
of what this concept entails and of its limitations and range of applicability. This paper represents an 
attempt in this direction, based on the collective knowledge and experience of the authors, deriving from 
many years of research on damage stability and survivability and a string of new concept designs for the 
passenger ship industry.
Con la nueva normativa para estabilidad en avería SOLAS 2009, en vigor desde enero de 2009, algunos 
propietarios de buques y en consecuencia los astilleros y sociedades de clasificación se están aventurando 
a explotar los nuevos grados de libertad que ofrece el concepto probabilístico de compartimentación del 
buque. En este proceso, a los diseñadores les cuesta superar la forma tradicional de conceptualizar, crear 
y terminar el diseño de un buque. Aparentemente, enfrentar la libertad total es difícil y requieren ayuda 
para atreverse a cruzar la línea entre el diseño tradicional y el diseño por objetivos. Esa labor sería facilitada 
con una mejor comprensión de lo que implica este enfoque de diseño y cuáles son sus limitaciones y rango 
de aplicación. Este trabajo es un esfuerzo en este sentido, con base en el conocimiento y experiencia de los 
autores, obtenidos en muchos años de investigación sobre la estabilidad en avería y supervivencia, y una 
serie de nuevos diseños conceptuales para la industria de buques de pasajeros.
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Introduction
From a ship stability viewpoint, the most 
fundamental goal to be achieved is for a ship to 
remain afloat and upright, especially so after an 
accident involving water ingress and flooding. 
Regulations to address the former are targeting 
subdivision and the latter damage stability. More 
recent instruments in the regulatory process 
tend to cater for both issues whilst contemporary 
developments have adopted a more holistic 
approach to safety that encompasses considerations 
of all principal hazards over the life-cycle of the 
vessel.
Notably, the first Merchant Shipping Act of 1854 
is the first known legal requirement addressing 
safety at sea concerning watertight bulkheads, 
leading eventually and after heavy loss of life to the 
adoption of the first internationally agreed system 
of subdivision in SOLAS 1929.
The first damage stability requirements, on the 
other hand, were introduced following the 1948 
SOLAS Convention and the first specific criterion 
on residual stability standards at the 1960 SOLAS 
Convention with the requirement for a minimum 
residual GM of 0.05m. This represented an 
attempt to introduce a margin to compensate for 
the upsetting environmental forces. "Additionally, 
in cases where the Administration considered the 
range of stability in the damaged condition to be 
doubtful, it could request further investigation to 
their satisfaction". Although this was a very vague 
statement, it is representative of the first attempts 
to legislate on the range of stability in the damaged 
condition. It is interesting to mention that a new 
regulation on "Watertight Integrity above the 
Margin Line" was also introduced reflecting the 
general desire to do all that was reasonably practical 
to ensure survival after severe collision damage by 
taking all necessary measures to limit the entry 
and spread of water above the bulkhead deck.
The first probabilistic damage stability rules 
for passenger vessels, deriving from the work of 
Kurt Wendel on “Subdivision of Ships”, [1] were 
introduced in the late sixties as an alternative to 
the deterministic requirements of SOLAS ‘60. 
Subsequently and at about the same time as the 
1974 SOLAS Convention was introduced, the 
International Maritime Organisation (IMO), 
published Resolution A.265 (VIII). The next major 
step in the development of stability standards came 
in 1992 with the introduction of SOLAS part B-1
(Chapter II-1), containing a probabilistic standard 
for cargo vessels, using the same principles embodied 
in the 1974 regulations. The same principle was used 
in launching at IMO the regulatory development 
of “Harmonisation of Damage Stability Provisions 
in SOLAS, based on the Probabilistic Concept of 
Survival” in the belief that this represented a more 
rational approach to addressing damage stability 
safety.
 
Evidence, however, of “common sense” driving rule 
making is very scarce; with accidents providing the 
main motivation for rule making, emphasis has 
primarily been placed on reducing consequences, 
i.e., on cure rather than prevention. Against this 
background, it is widely believed that the prevailing 
situation could be drastically improved through 
understanding of the underlying mechanisms 
leading to vessel loss and to identification of 
governing design and operation parameters to 
target risk reduction cost-effectively. This in 
turn necessitates the development of appropriate 
methods, tools and techniques capable of 
meaningfully addressing the physical phenomena 
involved.
Having said this, it was not until the early 90s 
when dynamic stability pertaining to ships in a 
damage condition, was addressed by simplified 
numerical models, such as the numerical model 
of damaged Ro-Ro vessel dynamic stability and 
survivability [2]. The subject of dynamic ship 
stability in waves with the hull breached received 
much attention following the tragic accident of 
Estonia, to the extent that lead to a step change 
in the way damage stability is being addressed, 
namely by assessing the performance of a vessel in 
a given environment and loading condition on the 
basis of first principles. In parallel, motivated by 
the compelling need to understand the impact of 
the then imminent introduction of probabilistic 
damage stability regulations on the design of cargo 
and passenger ships and the growing appreciation
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of deeply embedded problems in both the rules 
and the harmonisation process itself, an indepth 
evaluation and re-engineering of the whole 
probabilistic framework was launched through the 
EC-funded €4.5M, 3-year project HARDER [3]. 
The overriding goal of the HARDER project was 
to develop a rational procedure for probabilistic 
damage stability assessment, addressing from 
first principles all relevant aspects and underlying 
physical phenomena for all types of ships and 
damage scenarios. In this respect, HARDER 
became an IMO vehicle carrying a major load 
of the rule development process and fostering 
international collaboration at its best – a major factor 
contributing to the eventual success in achieving 
harmonisation and in proposing a workable 
framework for damage stability calculations in 
IMO SLF 47.
Deriving from developments at fundamental and 
applied levels in project HARDER as well as other 
EU projects such as NEREUS, ROROPROB and 
SAFEVSHIP and other international collaborative 
efforts (e.g., work at ITTC), a clearer understanding 
of damage stability started to emerge together with 
a confidence in the available knowledge and tools 
to address the subject effectively. All these efforts 
provided the inspiration and the foundation for 
SAFEDOR (2004 – Design / Operation / Regulation 
for Safety), a 20- million Euro EU FP6 Integrated 
Project of 4 years duration, which provided the 
opportunity for consolidating contemporary 
developments on damage survivability, thus 
rendering implementation possible even at 
design concept level. The knowledge gained can 
now be used to address critically all available 
regulatory instruments and to foster new and 
better methodologies to safeguard against known 
design deficiencies in the first instance, until safer 
designs evolve to reflect this knowledge, [4], [5], 
[6]. At this point in time, it is known for example 
that damaged ships in waves may capsize in one of 
the following modes (the first three after the final 
equilibrium condition is reached post-damage):
High freeboard ships: Provided there is some 
minimal positive righting lever and range of stability 
the ship will not capsize in moderate waves. Wave 
impacts on the side of the ship will induce some 
rolling in marginally stable cases, which could result 
in capsize at the larger sea states. Often ships are more 
vulnerable with the damage to leeward, since the 
GZ levers are typically less in the damaged direction 
and the induced dynamic roll is typically somewhat 
greater leeward.
Low freeboard Ro-Ro ships: This is the typical 
mechanism of capsize for Ro-Ro ships. The wave 
action gradually pumps water up onto the vehicle 
deck. The height of the water gradually increases until 
either a reasonably stable equilibrium level is reached 
where inflow is approximately equal to outflow for 
ships with sufficient reserve stability, or if stability 
is inadequate, the heeling moment of the water will 
cause a capsize to windward. In some rare cases Ro-
Ro vessels may heel to leeward after the first few wave 
encounters with an insufficient freeboard on the 
weather side to prevent further water accumulation 
and the ship will continue to take water on the vehicle 
deck until a capsize results.
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Low freeboard conventional ships: This is the 
typical mechanism of capsize for non-Ro-Ro ships. 
The highest waves will form boarding seas and will 
pile-up on the windward side of the deck, inducing 
roll and capsize, usually to windward. The weather 
deck tends to drain quickly if there is no capsize, and 
there is no build-up or accumulation of water as seem 
with enclosed Ro-Ro decks. One or two high waves in 
close succession are often sufficient to cause capsize.
Multi-Free-Surface Effect: This mechanism of 
capsize is relevant to ships with complex watertight 
subdivision such as cruise ships. As the hull is breached, 
water rushes through various compartments at 
different levels, substantially reducing stability even 
when the floodwater amount is relatively small. As a 
result the ship can heel to large angles, even for small 
damage openings, letting water into the upper decks 
that spreads rapidly through these spaces and may lead 
to rapid capsize at any stage of the flooding.
The aforementioned mechanisms of vessel capsize 
help to judging how relevant or effective available 
regulatory instruments are, in being able to prevent 
or mitigate disasters, as indicated in the following 
for the instruments currently in use or due to be 
enforced:
SOLAS 74: 1-compartment standard (prevent •	
ship from sinking if one compartment is 
breached; resistance to capsize in waves 
unknown)
SOLAS 90: 2-compartment standard (prevent •	
ship from sinking if any two compartments are 
breached; resist capsize of 2-compartment worst 
damage in sea states with Hs approximately 
3m – Ro-Ro vessels)
Stockholm Agreement (as above but with a •	
pre-defined level of water on deck depending 
on freeboard and in operational sea states of 
up to 4m Hs), [7]
Harmonised SOLAS Chapter II-1(SOLAS •	
2009 – equivalent to SOLAS 90. 
Concerning the latter, a stage has now been 
reached where the draft text of the major revision 
to the subdivision and damage stability sections 
of SOLAS Chapter II-1 based on a probabilistic 
approach has been completed following final 
amendments in January 2005 to Regulation 7-1 
involving calculation of the “p” factor. The revised 
regulations were adopted in May 2005 at the IMO 
MSC and entered into force for new vessels with 
keels laid on or after 1st January 2009. The new 
regulations represent a step change away from 
the current deterministic methods of assessing 
subdivision and damage stability. Old concepts 
such as floodable length, criterion numeral, margin 
line, 1 and 2 compartment standards and the B/5 
line will be disappearing.
With this in mind there appears to be a gap in that, 
whilst development of the probabilistic regulations 
included extensive calculations on existing ships 
which had been designed to meet the current SOLAS 
regulations, little or no effort has been expended 
into designing new ships from scratch using the 
proposed regulations. This gap has been addressed 
to a large extent in [4]. This paper builds on that 
by examining this (now) statutory requirement 
alongside other contemporary developments.
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Contemporary regulatory developments are already 
a step ahead, necessitating concerted effort at global 
level to ensure safe transition from deterministic 
to goal-based safety. More specifically, in May 
2000, the IMO Secretary- General called for a 
critical review of the safety of large passenger 
ships noting that "what merits due consideration 
is whether SOLAS requirements, several of which 
were drafted before some of these large ships were 
built, duly address all the safety aspects of their 
operation – in particular, in emergency situations”. 
This visionary prompt led IMO Maritime Safety 
Committee (MSC) to adopt a new “philosophy” 
and a working approach for developing safety 
standards for passenger ships. In this approach, 
illustrated in Fig. 1 (SLF 47/48), modern safety 
expectations are expressed as a set of specific safety 
goals and objectives, addressing design (prevention), 
operation (mitigation) and decision making in 
emergency situations with an overarching safety 
goal, commensurate with no loss of human life due 
to ship related accidents. The term “Safe Return to 
Port” has been widely adopted in discussing this 
framework, which addresses all the basic elements 
pre-requisite to quantifying the safety level (life-
cycle risk) of a ship at sea.
Fig. 1. The IMO Framework – Passenger Ship Safety
More specifically the following elements are
explicitly addressed:
1. Prevention/Protection: Emphasis must be placed 
on preventing the casualty from happening in the 
first place as well as on safeguards (in-built safety) 
to limit consequences.
2. Timeline Development: The focus is clearly on 
the timeline development of different events. For 
the first time in the history of rule-making, it is 
not only important to know whether a vessel will 
survive a given casualty in a given loading condition 
and operating environment but also the time the 
vessel will remain habitable, the time it takes for 
safe and orderly abandonment and for recovery of 
the people onboard.
3. Casualty Threshold: This advocates the fact 
that the ship should be designed for improved 
survivability so that, in the event of a casualty, 
persons can stay safely on board as the ship 
proceeds to port. In this respect and for design 
purposes (only), a casualty threshold needs to be 
defined whereby a ship suffering a casualty below
the defined threshold is expected to stay upright 
and afloat and be habitable for as long as necessary 
[5 days recommended] in order to return to port 
under its own power or wait for assistance.
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CASUALTY THRESHOLD CONCEPT
Casualty threshold is the extent of damage (flooding of fire) a ship 
is able to  withstand and still safely return to port
CASUALTY THRESHOLD 
NOT EXCEEDED
Safe return to port
· Indefinite survivability (afloat and upright)
· Fire Protection (safe areas)
· Availability of relevant function and systems
(navigation, propulsion, habitability)
· Essential safety systems
· Life safetty appliances
· 3 hours for abanbonment
CASUALTY THRESHOLD 
EXCEEDED
Safe and orderly abandonment
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The focuses in this paper is on the flooding 
survivability analysis though describing and 
discussing some early implementation results.
In this section, some early results will be presented 
aiming to provide answers and clarity to concepts 
deriving from contemporary developments in 
damage survivability. To this end, a hypothetical 
cruise ship is used with the following particulars: 
(See Table 1). The subdivision layout is shown in 
Figure 3.
4. Emergency Systems Availability / Evacuation and 
Rescue: Should a casualty threshold be exceeded the 
ship must remain stable and afloat for sufficiently 
long time to allow safe [3 hours recommended] and 
orderly evacuation (assembly, disembarkation and 
abandoning) of passengers and crew. Emergency 
systems availability to perform all requisite 
functions in any of the scenarios considered is, 
therefore, implicit in the framework. In addition, 
the ship should be crewed, equipped and have 
arrangements in place to ensure the health, safety, 
medical care and security of persons onboard in 
the area of operation, taking into account climatic 
conditions and the availability of SAR functions 
and until more specialised assistance is available.
Considering the above, it is worth emphasising 
that none of the questions arising (survival time?; 
functional availability post-casualty?; time needed 
for abandonment?) can be addressed in terms of 
rule compliance. Nonetheless, achievement of 
these goals in the proposed holistic, goal-based and 
proactive approach would ensure safety of human 
life commensurate with the safety expectations of 
today, by implicitly addressing all key elements of 
risk, for total risk (Safety Level) estimation and for 
direct use in Risk-Based Design, as explained in [8]. 
An evaluation framework, already being applied in 
the design of cruise/RoPax ships, is shown in Fig. 
2 next.
Fig. 2. Risk-Based Design Implementation (Safety Level)
Table 1. Principal particulars of example cruise vessel
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Early Implementation Results
Length 270 m
Breadth 35.5 m
Draught 8.3 m
Displacement 56,500 tonnes
Metacentric Height 2.35 m
Number of passengers 2,300
Attained Index of Subdivision, A 0.8
Required Index of Subdivision, R 0.8
65
Fig. 3. Largely “Unguided” Subdivision (Probabilistic Rules)
Flooding survivability analysis normally entails the 
following, the first three of which are addressed 
here at various levels of detail.
Statutory Assessment•	
– Compliance with SOLAS 2009 (probabilistic 
rules)
– Optimisation of watertight subdivision
Transient-, cross- and progressive-flooding •	
assessment
– Static vs. dynamic stability
– Time to flood
Time to Capsize•	
– Probabilistic approach for selection of 
damage (collision and grounding) cases
– Vulnerability approach for survivability 
assessment
Systems availability for each flooding scenario•	
– Geometrical and topological evaluation of 
main ship systems
Evacuability assessment•	
– Assembly and evacuation performance
– Assessment of time to capsize against total 
evacuation time
Evaluation of casualty threshold / return to •	
port capability
– Probabilistic approach; link to system 
availability post-casualty
Acknowledging that emphasis on preventing 
a casualty from occurring in the first instance 
must take priority, focus on risk reduction by 
passive means (in-built safety) must come next 
and this must start at the beginning. To this 
end, the dilemma of prescriptive SOLAS-minded 
designers, illustrated in Fig. 3, in the simplest of 
levels, must be overcome. It is obvious that internal 
subdivision arrangement is a key issue affecting 
ship performance, functionality and safety, all of 
which have to date been catered for through the 
provision of rules and regulations that reflect, in 
essence, codification of best practice. Throwing 
this away and leaving on the table a blank sheet, 
makes ship subdivision a very difficult problem 
indeed. This was essentially the problem addressed 
in the EU project ROROPROB, [9]. 
Building on the understanding of Index A as 
outlined [4] – [6], affords a straightforward way 
of determining the relative (collision damage) risk 
profile of a vessel at an early design stage and hence 
devise an effective means of risk reduction by 
focusing primarily on the high risk scenarios.
The fully automated optimisation process typically 
produces several hundred design alternatives 
depending on the complexity of the ship’s layout 
and the number of variables. Typical variables of the 
optimisation problem include: type of subdivision, 
number, location and height of watertight 
bulkheads, deck heights, tank arrangement, 
casings, double hull, and position of staircases, lifts 
and escapes. 
Using the Attained Subdivision Index, payload 
capacity, steel weight and other regulatory 
requirements as typical objectives/constraints, the 
optimisation problem outcome typically includes: 
reduced number of bulkheads, reduced deck 
heights, reduced void volume, reduced number of 
escape ways and required staircases, reduced steel 
weight, reduced complexity in tank arrangements, 
increased crew and service areas, improved 
functionality and, if required, improved Attained 
Minor damage concept (still deterministic) for passenger
vessels, but no specific requirements on location of watertight
subdivision. Required index to be met
A > R
Collision bulkheadMachinery space bulkhead
New requirements for
double bottom
Aft peak bulkhead
Flooding Survivability Analysis
Statutory assessment
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Subdivision Index. In order to make the process 
effective, participation by all decisionmakers 
(designer, owner and yard) is essential to properly 
define the optimisation variables, objectives 
and constraints as early as possible in the design 
stage. Using this approach, known as platform 
optimisation, high survivability internal ship layouts 
can be developed, without deviating much from the 
current SOLAS practice, this making it easier for 
ship designers to relate to the proposed procedure. 
The actual process for platform optimisation as it 
is currently being applied to newbuildings design 
is illustrated in Fig. 4. In order to make the process 
effective, the participation of all decision-makers 
(the designer, the owner, the yard) is essential 
to properly define the optimisation variables, 
objectives and constraints. Using this approach, 
high survivability internal ship layouts have been 
developed, without deviating much from the 
current SOLAS practice, this making it easy for 
ship designers to relate to the proposed practice. 
A sample of the optimisation problem outcome is 
presented in Fig. 5.
Specification Design Variables
- Height of Fb. Deck
- No. position and height
of bulkheads
- Double hull
Objectives/Constraints
- Maximum payload
- A ≥ R
Generic
Algorithm
Optimisation
Modelling
Layout Parametric
Model Input
NAPA 
Parametric Model
Basis Ship
R = 0,8
1300 designs
Design Filtering
Outcome
9 Acceptable
Designs (A≥0,8)
Consultation
Optimisation
Problem Setup
Internal Parametric
Optimisation
Basis Platform
Fig. 4. Platform Optimisation Process
Fig. 5. Platform Optimisation Process – Concept Designs
0,955
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0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200
Feasible designs
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Using Table 1 particulars and Fig. 6 (Version 1) 
as a basis, Version 5 (Fig. 7) is produced using the 
process utilised above with A=0.92.
Taking additional measures from the available array 
of current best SOLAS practice, it was possible 
to further increase the attained AIndex to 0.985, 
without sacrificing any of the vessel’s functionality. 
Time domain simulations with PROTEUS3, [10], 
have shown that such a vessel survives all probable
damages up to 4-compartment damage for all sea 
states up to 4 m Hs.
The risk profile of Version 1 ship is illustrated 
in Fig. 8 for all the statistically possible damage 
Fig. 8. Distribution of Relative Contribution to Risk per Damage Case, Ver 1
Fig. 6. Hypothetical cruise vessel subdivision, Ver 1
Fig. 7. Hypothetical cruise vessel subdivision, Ver 5
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scenarios deriving from the probabilistic rules (Hs, 
loading condition, collision and grounding – the 
latter in addition to the current set of scenarios, 
which relate only to collision damage statistics).
These scenarios could be supplemented by using 
relevant experiential knowledge judiciously and 
through HAZID/brainstorming sessions with 
designer/yard/owner participating, aiming to 
identify any design vulnerability. Numerical 
simulations can then be used in calm water and in 
waves (as required) to establish the exact flooding 
mechanism and identify cost-effective changes 
for the local watertight arrangement using, for 
example, the PROTEUS3 software suite. The results 
are analysed in terms of occurrence of potentially 
dangerous behaviour or attitudes by addressing the 
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following three modes of flooding explicitly, on a 
case by case basis and using a much more complex 
(in terms of number of compartments and number 
of openings) and a more complete model (up to 5 
decks are being modelled – see Fig. 9):
(i) Initial (transient) Flooding
(ii) Cross-Flooding
(iii) Progressive Flooding
Transient and Intermediate Flooding
Having to deal with such a complex geometry, 
explicit dynamic flooding simulation of a damaged 
ship in waves is a must. Static analysis simply 
will not do. Moreover, in some cases where 
cross-flooding through intricate connection 
arrangements becomes a problem in terms of long 
cross-flooding times, results from simplified time-
domain simulation codes need to be supported 
using CFD as the only viable option for a proper 
treatment of such a problem. The fact that industry 
appears to be pre-ordained to use static analysis 
when addressing damage survivability could at 
best affect adversely the design process and at worst 
severely undermine safety. Figs 10 and 11 (see fig.11 
in page 67) demonstrate two such cases. In Fig. 
10, the sfactor results in zero, because the angle of 
inclination exceeds the statutory range, which does 
not reflect what actually happens.
Conversely, Fig. 11 shows a damage case where 
the s-factor is non-zero based on the SOLAS 2009 
formulation whilst numerical simulation results 
indicate progressive flooding, likely to result in 
capsize/sinking.
Multi-free Surface Effect
Fig. 12 demonstrates the result described in the 
introductory section.
Bulkhead Deck Submergence and Progressive
Flooding (Ducting, Piping, Doors, Windows,
Shafts, etc)
Scenarios of this nature demonstrate the need for 
explicit knowledge on how the flooding process 
evolves, as in many cases it proves to be rather 
Fig. 9. Typical Model used for Flooding Survivability
Analysis
Fig. 12. Multi-Free Surface Effect during Intermediate
Stages of Flooding
Fig. 10. Numerical Simulation of Transient Flooding behaviour (calculated s=0)
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straightforward to impede the evolution of flooding 
with easy and very costeffective measures. Figs 13 
and 14 show the post-processing that modern tools 
afford in this quest. The results of the foregoing investigation is analysed 
in terms of the distribution for the time it takes the 
vessel to capsize/sink, one of the key parameters in 
flooding risk estimation.
Accounting only for the damage case scenarios 
implicit in the new harmonised rules for damage 
stability (normally over 1,000) and considering 
the 3 loading conditions, also implicit in the rules, 
and some 10 sea states per damage case, it becomes 
readily obvious that brute-force time-domain 
simulations is not the “route to salvation”. In view 
of this, two lines of action are being followed: 
the first entails automation of the process using 
Monte Carlo simulation and performance-based 
assessment; the second relates to the development 
of a simpler (inference) model for estimating the 
time to capsize for any given collision damage 
scenario. For the example cruise vessel, results 
using the simpler model are displayed in Fig. 15.
A close examination of Fig. 15 reveals that a 15% 
increase in Index-A from version 1 to version 5 
of the hypothetical cruise ship, results in a 60% 
reduction in the probability to capsize within 3 
hours. Knowledge of the probability of survival 
beyond [3] hours in all relevant flooding scenarios 
would provide the basis for ascertaining safe return 
Fig. 13. Time-Domain Simulation of the Flooding
Process (windows and SWT doors)
Fig. 14. Time-Domain Simulation of the Flooding
Process (various openings)
Fig. 11. Numerical Simulation of Transient Flooding behaviour (calculated s=1)
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000
Time [Sec]
Roll 
[Deg]
Windows under water
SWT Doors D2 Holding
D2
D3
D1
Time to Capsize
Designing for Damage Stability and Survivability
Year 3 - n.° 5 - vol. 1 - (57-69) July 2009 - Cartagena (Colombia)
Ship Science & Technology - ISSN 1909 8642
70
0 60 120 180 240 300 360 420 480 540 600
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
Time to capsize [minutes]
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 o
f c
ap
siz
e
Ver 1
Ver 5
Fig. 15. Cumulative probability distribution for time to capsize within a given time for 
two ship layouts shown in Figs. 6 and 7
Fig. 16. Defining a Damage Threshold
to port capability.
Moreover, an introspective look into the results 
of the example cruise ship, shown below in Fig. 
16, reveals that with Index-A of 0.8 the risk 
contribution of 2-compartment damages is just 
over 2%, reducing to zero for Version 5 (A=0.92). 
In the latter, even for 3-compartment damages 
the risk contribution falls below 2%. Hence, with 
little judiciously expended effort, the damage 
survivability standard of passenger ships could be 
increased well beyond current levels without any 
adverse defect on ship functionality and earning 
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potential.
Based on the work presented in the foregoing, the 
following concluding remarks may be drawn:
With a clear trend towards probabilistic and •	
risk-based frameworks to addressing ship safety 
in a holistic manner, it is important to base 
Co cluding Remarks
71
such developments on clear understanding of 
the underlying principles and of the intention 
of the ensuing rules and regulations and/or 
criteria.
The need to inculcate all major stakeholders in •	
these new developments must remain a priority 
and clear targets set to facilitate the transition 
from prescriptive to goal-setting regulations.
The probabilistic framework of the new •	
harmonised rules for damage stability 
calculations offer flexibility and added degrees 
of freedom for designers to enhance safety 
cost-effectively both in targeting statutory 
compliance as well as pursuing specific safety 
objectives in the strife of the maritime industry 
to embrace innovation as a means of ginning 
and sustaining competitive advantage.
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